The Demon at the Center
Jeffrey K. Tulist

Ronald Reagan, the Movie and Other Episodes in PoliticalDemonology. Michael Paul Rogin. University of California Press, Berkeley,
Cal., 1987, Pp. xx, 366. $25.00.

In the puzzle about whether there can be unconstitutional
constitutional amendments, one can notice a problem inherent to
all views of American politics. All understandings of the American
polity presuppose a distinction between core and peripheral elements. The lawyer who believes that some amendments to the
Constitution are unconstitutional, even though the new text satisfies all the procedural provisions of Article V, rests her case on the
claim that the proposed amendment offends some fundamental
value or principle of the Constitution. On the other hand, those
who believe that any amendment that surmounts the hurdles of
Article V is therefore constitutional are making the claim that procedure is the core of the Constitution.1 The puzzle is no mere academic conundrum but rather an avenue into the meaning of
America.
The larger literature of American political culture can be read,
too, as an extended debate over the definition of America. Because
students of political culture have addressed the question of collective identity explicitly, their work should be helpful to constitutional theorists, whose arguments regarding the defining elements
of the polity often remain implicit. Moreover, by addressing collective identity as an explicit theme, one is led quickly to see more
clearly the extra-constitutional aspects of America's constitutive

thought.
Although it is difficult to characterize as a whole, much of the
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literature on American political culture has been preoccupied with
explaining the benign center of American politics while accounting
for the irrational and malign character of the periphery. This
American duality is often said to mark America as "exceptional,"
although the attributes of distinction and causes of it are continual
sources of scholarly dispute. Some have traced the preoccupation
with America's exceptional character to post World War II scholarly interests and popular fears of communism. Why is it, asked
scholars from both the left and the right, that viable socialist
movements have never taken root in America? Why has American
politics been less ideological than that of other industrial nations?
These sorts of questions have inspired recent studies, but exceptionalism more broadly understood has a much longer legacy.
Puritan settlers provided America with a political vocabulary
drawn from the Bible emphasizing the country's providential design. 2 More secular political leaders from the Federalists through
Lincoln noted that:
It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been
reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and
example, to decide the important question, whether societies
of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever
destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident
and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at
which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the
era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election
on the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.'
Exceptionalism remains a theme around which most accounts
of American politics radiate today, whether or not that theme is
specifically addressed. Whether explicit or not, much writing on
the theme today is derivative of the exceptional thought of the
founding in the sense that it exemplifies the secularized democratic
Puritanism visible in more self-conscious form in colonial rhetoric.
For example, Louis Hartz's well known account marks America as
beholden to a special history free from feudal hierarchies.' In
Hartz's reading, this special history accounts for American consen2 On this point, see especially Sacvan Bercovitch, The American Jeremiad (1978), and
Sacvan Bercovitch, The Puritan Origins of the American Self (1975).
3 Federalist 1, in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 33 (1961).
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sus-style politics, free from the ideological divides that characterize
so many European polities. The attention to the movement of history echoes the classic American preoccupation with a secularized
Providence, and the focus upon consensus elaborates The Federalist's claim that America is democracy's test.
If the center is depicted as democratic in the accounts of consensus school historians and pluralist political scientists, the periphery is often portrayed as authoritarian, irrational, or in the
phrase of Richard Hofstadter, "paranoid. '5 Excluded groups are
depicted as resentful of their status and irrationally fearful of the
power of the cosmopolitan center to oppress them. For example,
Joseph Gusfield analyzed the politics of the temperance movement
as a product of the status anxiety of increasingly marginalized
elites. 6
The brilliant political scientist Michael Paul Rogin directly
challenges all of these common theses of American political culture
in a profoundly disturbing new book. In Ronald Reagan, the Movie
and Other Episodes in PoliticalDemonology,7 Rogin reverses conventional wisdom. He argues that the center of American politics is
irrationally and malignly countersubversive, while the periphery is
the locus of truly noble, not merely benign,'American aspirations
and attitudes. As Rogin states at the outset:
The aim of this book is to name and characterize a
countersubversive tradition at the center of American politics
....
[The] terms, countersubversive tradition and political
demonology, are not in common discourse. I use them to call
attention to the creation of monsters as a continuing feature
of American politics by the inflation, stigmatization, and dehumanization of political foes. (p. xiii).
Rogin does not offer a new history, chronologically presented.
Instead, he presents a series of essays to illuminate the thesis from
several angles. He treats competing conceptions of American politics in essays on political repression and pluralist group theory, as
well as in an acute retrospective essay that concludes the book
while it summarizes Rogin's career.8 The relation of Indians,
5 Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays 3-40
(1979).
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8 Rogin's major publications include: The Intellectuals and McCarthy (1967); Fathers
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blacks, and women to the American center are the subjects of several chapters. The countersubversive significance of the presidency
is the subject of two essays. Finally, the book gains its title from
one of three essays devoted to demonological themes in American
cinema, a form especially suited, he argues, to countersubversive
stratagems. (One of the cinematic chapters is on Reagan, another
is on Cold War movies, the third, and perhaps the finest essay in
the book, is on D.W. Griffith's The Birth of a Nation.)
It is impossible to summarize, let alone do justice to, the richness of these essays in a review such as this. One can 'nonetheless
illustrate the significance of Rogin's essays with additional contrasts of his views and conventional perspectives on the American
polity.
For example, the study of excluded groups is not itself a new
project. Numerous studies point to their existence and argue for
their inclusion in a fully American history. Rogin, however, focuses
not so much on the excluded groups themselves as on the centeron the leaders and groups that do the excluding. To be sure, many
scholars have been interested in the processes of political exploitation. But the materialist basis of most work with this theme precludes examination of the semi-autonomous power of political
ideas. Says Rogin:
The American economy exploited peoples of color, but
American racial history is not reducible to its economic roots.
A distinctive American political tradition that was fearful of
primitivism and disorder developed in response to peoples of
color. That tradition defines itself against alien threats to the
American way of life and sanctions violent and exclusionary
responses to them. (p. 45).
On the other hand, Rogin contends, scholarship that has been
most sensitive to the political significance of thought and ideology
has incorrectly identified the truly constitutive ideas. For example,
recent attempts to resurrect and amplify a "republican" tradition
in American political discourse have failed to see the true significance of American's Puritan origins. "Whatever the power of the
classical tradition for eighteenth-century revolutionaries and constitution makers,

. . .

republicanism has made a smaller contribu-

tion to the peculiarly American form of liberal nationalism than
has the conjunction of Protestant Christianity with American westward expansion" (p. 283). Rather than view America through the
Subversive Genealogy: The Politics and Art of Herman Melville (1984).
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lens of European categories, Rogin urges us to seek a truly indigenous angle of vision.
Although my work ... stresses the importance of communal
aspirations, it does so not by searching for corporate alternatives to liberal individualism but by examining communal and
autarkic wishes within it. Instead, therefore, of seeking a place
to stand inside America that is derived from the tradition of
English Puritans, European republicans, or Scottish commonsense philosophers, my ground is the critical analysis of liberalism itself. (p. 281).
To probe the interior of American liberalism, Rogin explores
its psychology. The dominant center does not merely exploit the
periphery; it defines and reveals its inner uncertainty through manipulation of marginal groups. The countersubversive's construction of excluded peoples as conspiring to overthrow the center
speaks less to the political place of the periphery than it does to
the character of the center. For example,
Responses to the Indians point to the mixture of cultural
arrogance and insecurity in the American history of countersubversion. The identity of a self-making people, engaged in a
national, purifying mission, may be particularly vulnerable to
threats of contamination and disintegration. The need to draw
rigid boundaries between the alien and the self suggests fears
of too dangerous an intimacy between them. (p. 50).
Rogin patiently moves beyond the exercise of unmasking the
center's false claims about the periphery. It is the meaning of these
ascriptions rather than their immediate effects that deserves the
attention of those interested in the problem of collective identity.
Seen this way, the construction of the periphery as subversive and
threateningly malign is not merely the unjust act of the powerful,
but is rather an aspect of that power. Or as Rogin states, it is
"America's dark double":
The alien comes to birth as the American's dark double,
the imaginary twin who sustains his (or her) brother's identity. Taken inside, the subversive would obliterate the American; driven outside, the subversive becomes an alien who
serves as repository for the disowned, negative American self.
The alien preserves American identity against fears of boundary collapse and thereby allows the countersubversive, now
split from the subversive, to mirror his foe. (p. 284).
Rogin's psychological insights are the great strength of the
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book. They are also its small weaknesses. When Rogin discusses
the psychologies of particular men as windows upon the culture
that honors them-D.W. Griffith, Ronald Reagan, or Abraham
Lincoln, for example-his observations are both probing and politically acute. At several junctures, however, Rogin claims to be interested not in the cultural resonance of individual psychologies
but rather in the individual personalities themselves (see, e.g., p.
293). We are treated to fascinating but politically irrelevant details
about Griffith's and Reagan's personal lives.
Even when focused directly on the political realm, Rogin's
masterful application of psychological and interpretive insights is
stronger in its critique of the legitimacy and self-definition of the
American center than it is in articulating its own theory of legitimate rule (perhaps the subject for another book). For example, following Tocqueville, Rogin shows clearly that the destruction of native American Indians was the inevitable result of American
"liberalism." Both the image of the Indian as monstrous and as
noble savage
appropriated Indians for white purposes. Both made the Indians children of nature instead of creators and inhabitants of
their own cultures. Both ignored Indian agriculture and depicted a tribalism that menaced private property and the family. Neither the noble nor the devilish savage could coexist
with the advancing white civilization. Both images rationalized the dispossession of the tribes. (p. 46). 9
Left implicit in Rogin's keen analysis is the non-liberal (or improved liberal) polity from whence this kind of critique can be
launched. Put another way, Rogin's preferred polity seems to rest
on liberal tolerance at the same time that it eschews liberal American culture. How would it work?
An unintended irony also suffuses this book. After learning
that the center imitates the periphery that it constructs, one begins to wonder about the extent to which Rogin's new construction-the countersubversive-is Rogin's own dark double. There
may bg no more lucid "conspiracy theorist" writing today than
Rogin, who ascribes coherence, coordination, and almost supernatural powers to a reconstructed center led by elites who have maintained a two century-old conspiracy. One need not be a naive positivist to wonder whether something may be amiss when everything
I See Alexis de Tocqueville, 1 Democracy in America 316-407 (J.P. Mayer, ed. 1969),
and Ralph Lerner, The Thinking Revolutionary (1987) chs. 4, 5.
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Reagan says or does not say confirms the thesis that he is the
apotheosis of the countersubversive tradition.
Unlike the utterances of a countersubversive, however, Rogin's
reflections are full of wit. Indeed, the provocative partisan bite of
these essays along with their elegant and humorous style make
them a delight to read. Ronald Reagan, the Movie is the culmination of an ambitious project to reinterpret the major strands of
American political culture. Given such scope, it need only be partially successful (and it is surely that at least) to be one of the best
books on American politics published in the last decade.

